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In an era where the volume of structured and unstructured digital data has exploded, 
there has been an enormous growth in the creation of data about individuals that can 
be used for understanding and treating disease. Joining these records together at an 
individual level provides a complete picture of a patient’s interaction with health services 
and allows better assessment of patient outcomes and effectiveness of treatment and 
services. Record linkage techniques provide an efficient and cost-effective method to 
bring individual records together as patient profiles. These linkage procedures bring 
their own challenges, especially relating to the protection of privacy. The development 
and implementation of record linkage systems that do not require the release of per-
sonal information can reduce the risks associated with record linkage and overcome 
legal barriers to data sharing. Current conceptual and experimental privacy-preserving 
record linkage (PPRL) models show promise in addressing data integration challenges. 
Enhancing and operationalizing PPRL protocols can help address the dilemma faced 
by some custodians between using data to improve quality of life and dealing with the 
ethical, legal, and administrative issues associated with protecting an individual’s privacy. 
These methods can reduce the risk to privacy, as they do not require personally identify-
ing information to be shared. PPRL methods can improve the delivery of record linkage 
services to the health and broader research community.
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iNtrODUctiON
Unabating growth in the creation of data, coupled with advances in information technology 
and Internet connectivity, provides tremendous potential for data-driven breakthroughs in the 
understanding, treatment, and prevention of disease. These health research innovations are being 
complemented by data from non-traditional sources (i.e., from sources other than administrative 
health and survey records). Opportunities include the use of mobile phone records (1) and Google 
search histories (2) for disease surveillance, patient collected data from wearable devices (3), and 
manual journaling through mobile phone applications (4). Data from the private health sector and 
government administrative datasets that lie outside the health sector (5) are also of interest, as is 
spatial information that has direct application for understanding exposures and inequalities (6). 
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Genetic information unavailable a generation ago is already used 
in clinical decision making (7), and its importance is only likely 
to increase. The key to unlocking these data is in relating details 
at an individual patient level to provide an understanding of risk 
factors and appropriate interventions (8).
A key methodology that has supported health research is 
record linkage, a process of accurately bringing together records 
from multiple datasets that belong to the same person. Through 
record linkage, it has been possible to construct and analyze 
population-wide datasets comprising “linked” administrative 
records pertaining to each individual. Health-based record link-
age frameworks have been established, which routinely integrate 
data from hospital admissions, emergency departments, primary 
care facilities, birth, death, and disease registries (1, 2), creating a 
rich analytic resource to support evidence-based decision making 
(9–11).
Present models of record linkage use trusted third parties 
(TTPs) or data linkage units (DLUs) to accurately match records 
using personal identifiers (12). Incorporating information from 
new and diverse data sources into these linkage frameworks are 
likely to have significant benefits to research; however, the opera-
tional and administrative overheads are substantial. Technical 
issues (i.e., scalability, efficiency) and effects on linkage quality 
(accuracy) will also be impacted and need to be assessed.
Sharing of public and private datasets also presents privacy 
and confidentiality challenges. Protecting the privacy of individu-
als is paramount in the record linkage process and essential to 
maintain community support and trust. There are serious ethical 
implications in combining information on individuals (generally 
without direct consent) from government and other sources; 
essentially a form of surveillance of an entire population. For 
some privacy advocates, this is a bridge too far, conjuring up 
images of an Orwellian dystopia or the excesses of totalitarian 
regimes (13, 14). Health researchers argue that privacy risks can 
be minimized and that the public benefit of utilizing these rich 
datasets outweighs the risk to privacy; that is, there is an ethical 
imperative to conduct record linkage for research (15). The public’s 
view on this issue is not always clear; numerous surveys have been 
conducted in Australia, which sometimes return contradictory 
results regarding Australian views on the use of personal health 
information [see Ref. (16). for a review]. Similar contradictions 
have been observed in results from Canadian surveys (14).
While a number of existing processes and techniques are 
used to maintain patient privacy during record linkage (17), the 
development of new and improved linkage methods may provide 
an opportunity for alternative approaches that further reduce 
privacy risks without compromising on linkage quality.
This article discusses the emergence and potential benefit 
of record linkage techniques that limit the release of personal 
identifiers for linkage. These methods, collectively referred to 
as privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL), operate in such a 
way that they do not require the release of personally identify-
ing information by data custodians. PPRL methods work on 
information that has been permanently encoded, encrypted, or 
transformed before releasing the data for linkage. Through PPRL 
methods, the benefits of linkage can be realized without the risks 
associated with disclosure of personal information.
eXistiNG recOrD LiNKAGe 
FrAMeWOrKs
There is a long history in Australia of record linkage support-
ing both jurisdictional level and national research and health 
decision making (10, 12, 18). Record linkage capabilities in all 
jurisdictions (19–21) have recently been strengthened, and in 
many cases expanded, through strategic national investment: 
through the National Collaborative Research Infrastructure 
Strategy in Australia; the Canadian Institutes of Health Research 
in Canada; and through the Farr Institute initiative in the United 
Kingdom (22).
The record linkage framework adopted by most of these 
jurisdictions is a TTP model, whereby dedicated linkage units 
undertake record linkage to service and support research. 
Administrative data collections (such as hospital discharges, 
emergency presentations, mortality, and cancer registers) have 
typically formed the backbone of enduring record linkage sys-
tems (18, 23). Such collections are highly confidential, containing 
sensitive personal information that is protected by law.
recOrD LiNKAGe AND PrivAcY
Linkage of person-level records through the use of personally 
identifying information, and generally without consent, has 
significant ethical and legal implications that have been at the 
forefront of issues confronted and addressed by DLUs (12, 24).
The extent to which data can be used in record linkage depends 
on the applicable legislation in each jurisdiction. Some adminis-
trative collections are bound by specific laws which either pro-
hibit or severely curtail the release of personal information from 
these systems.1 It has been claimed that more than 500 secrecy 
and privacy provisions exist in Australian Commonwealth laws, 
imposing considerable limits on the availability and use of iden-
tifiable data (25). At Commonwealth level, privacy laws permit 
some level of disclosure of personal information by authorities 
for human research (Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 s 95). The 
release of personal data for linkage can be authorized if public 
benefit outweighs the privacy of individuals (26).
Working within these legal frameworks, data custodians, 
DLUs, and the research community in Australia have developed 
secure data access and usage models that provide important 
safeguards to privacy. DLUs have also implemented best practice 
data governance policies and practices to minimize further the 
privacy risks posed by their operations (12, 18, 19, 27–29).
This includes utilizing the “separation principle” (30), a 
simple method for restricting the type of data received by each 
organization in the linkage process. Under this principle, the DLU 
receives only the personally identifying information required for 
linkage, but not the content data. The researcher, on the other 
1 In Western Australia, for example, both the WA Children’s Court Act 1988 and 
the Young Offenders Act 1994 curtail the release of information for research in 
relation to juvenile offenders. In South Australia, state-based regulations restrict 
the release of information from the SA Perinatal Statistics Collection (SA Health 
Care Variation Regulations 2010, Reg 4). Similar legal barriers exist in other 
jurisdictions, both locally and internationally. 
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hand, receives only the content but not personal identifying 
information. Only the data custodian has access to both personal 
identifying information and clinical content data.
The use of the separation principle greatly enhances privacy. 
However, in many instances, the risk to privacy can be still large. 
For instance, knowledge that a particular individual has a record 
within a data collection is itself revealing, especially for specific 
data collections such as mental health inpatient datasets or cancer 
registries. This information will be still provided to the linkage 
unit under the separation principle.
The release of personally identifying information always 
carries some additional risk, as more individuals have access to 
this information. While rare, attempting to determine whether 
a person of interest is contained within a dataset does occur; 
for instance, US intelligence agents have used their surveillance 
capabilities to spy on romantic interests (31), as have Australian 
telecommunications workers (32).
Some custodians remain averse to the release of personal 
information for reasons that extend beyond privacy risks, such 
as discrimination, reputational damage and/or embarrassment, 
criminal misuse of the data, and commercial harm (25).
Legislative barriers and risk aversion by data custodians are 
currently being challenged by open data policies and a growing 
need by and for government to work with private industry to 
more effectively service community needs. A recent Productivity 
Commission Inquiry into the benefits and costs of increasing the 
availability and use of public and private sector data recognizes 
the barriers and risks associated with working with named data 
(25). The Inquiry outlines a framework for data sharing under-
pinned by legislative change, governance structures (to remove 
blocks and increase data access), and the development of “systems 
and processes […] to identify, assess, manage and mitigate risks 
related not just to data release and sharing, but also data collec-
tion and storage” [(25), p.9].
The issues being encountered in Australia are shared inter-
nationally. DLUs in the United States, Canada, and Europe face 
similar legal and risk-related hurdles (e.g., the United States: 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 1996, Canada: 
Personal Health Information Protection Act 2004, and Europe: 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC). German laws in relation to 
the disclosure of personal information are particularly restric-
tive (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz—Federal Data Protection Act of 
Germany) and, in some cases, only a single data item can be used 
for anonymous linkage (33).
PrivAcY-PreserviNG sOLUtiONs
Privacy-preserving record linkage protocols utilize algorithms 
and techniques to conduct linkage on encrypted or masked infor-
mation; these methods do not require data custodians to release 
personal identifiers to third parties. This reduces the risks associ-
ated with the release of personal data. Three important attributes 
characterize all PPRL protocols: accuracy, efficiency, and privacy.
Different classes of privacy-preserving linkage methods pro-
vide differing levels of privacy protection. These range from tech-
niques such as the statistical linkage key that simply amalgamates 
parts of a person’s identifiers into a single variable (34) to methods 
that encrypt or encode the data so that those with access cannot 
learn any information directly from the encrypted values. The 
exact level of privacy required will always depend on context, but 
all things being equal, a protocol with higher privacy is preferred.
An important difference in PPRL protocols is the method of 
matching which impacts on linkage quality (accuracy). Protocols 
may perform matching on a particular set of identifiers, using 
either exact or similarity comparisons. Similarity matching 
enables records with slight differences to come together, which 
is vital for obtaining high-quality linkage results (accuracy). For 
this reason, PPRL protocols that utilize approximate matching 
are favored.
Efficiency can be often a concern for record linkage and will 
continue to present challenges to DLUs as the volume of data con-
tinues to grow. Although there are no established performance 
standards, record linkage is computationally slow, and for any 
PPRL protocol to be practical, it must complete within a reason-
able time frame.
The extent to which these protocols are used in practice varies. 
To date, most PPRL implementations use exact matching on par-
ticular attributes of a dataset (35), which are typically irreversibly 
encoded to ensure privacy (36). Though efficient, these methods 
have reduced linkage quality and, therefore, are operationally 
unsuitable in DLUs.
Of all PPRL methods, the Bloom filter method appears to be 
the most promising for operational use (37). An advantage of 
the Bloom method over other PPRL methods is that it utilizes 
approximate matching while providing similar or superior pri-
vacy protection. The method has been evaluated on large-scale, 
real world health datasets, with results returning equal linkage 
quality and similar efficiency to traditional linkage methods 
(which use personal identifiers in the matching process) (38). 
No record linkage method, privacy preserving or not, achieves 
perfect accuracy—to be able to achieve equal accuracy to the 
standard non-privacy-preserving approach is a considerable 
accomplishment. The security of the protocol has been rigorously 
investigated (39–41). Cryptographic attacks on the algorithm 
found ways to reveal some identifiers (40). However, modifica-
tions to the protocol have rendered these attacks fruitless (42); 
there are currently no known security vulnerabilities with the 
protocol.
The introduction of the Bloom filter method brings new chal-
lenges (17). As well as operational requirements around designing 
optimal linkage strategies, new ways of validating record linkage 
results need to be developed. In traditional record linkage, link-
age results are validated through clerical inspection (or “manual 
review”) of personal identifiers; however, in a privacy-preserved 
context where all data are encoded, there is no way to manually 
review the data or correct possible data or linkage errors. New 
methods for validating linkage results under privacy-preserved 
linkage model are emerging, however (43).
PPrL: AN eXAMPLe
Consider the (hypothetical) scenario: to attempt to reduce the 
rate of youth suicide, the government of the day has invested in 
a comprehensive mental health care package for those who have 
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attempted suicide. The government wishes to see whether their 
program has worked in reducing the rate of suicide and attempted 
suicide.
To answer this question, two datasets will be required: a 
hospital admissions dataset and a mortality register. From the 
hospital admissions dataset, records will be required to be sent 
to the linkage unit for all those persons who have attempted 
suicide before and after the start of the health intervention; all 
records from the mortality register will be required by the linkage 
unit. The linkage unit will receive only the personal identifying 
information required for linkage (i.e., name, date of birth, gender, 
address). The linkage unit identifies which records from the 
supplied hospital dataset have associated mortality records. The 
linkage unit passes this information back to the data custodians, 
who then provide the content data (i.e., not personally identifying 
information) to the researcher for the hospital records, and any 
linked mortality records, along with a key that identifies which 
records belong to which individual. The researcher can then use 
this information to determine whether the intervention reduced 
suicide and attempted suicide rates.
The privacy risk in the aforementioned scenario is the delivery 
to the linkage unit of personal identifying information from hos-
pital records of those who have attempted suicide. This extremely 
sensitive information has been made available to a third party. 
The use of privacy-preserving linkage methods would remove this 
risk; instead, the linkage unit would receive encrypted personal 
identifiers; they would have no means of identifying any of these 
individuals, but would still have the ability to determine which 
records belong to the same individual between datasets.
GrOWiNG iNterNAtiONAL  
iNterest iN PPrL
With a growing demand for linked data from government and 
the university sector, interest in PPRL, particularly the Bloom 
filter method, is flourishing. Interest stems from two principal 
sources: at a technical level, by computer scientists and cryptog-
raphers with interests in information and data security, and at an 
operational level, by groups with interest in and responsibility for 
delivering record linkage services.
Several groups are actively developing and refining PPRL 
methods at the scientific level including the German Record 
Linkage Center (University of Duisburg-Essen) (44, 45), the 
Research School of Computer Science (Australian National 
University) (46–48), and the Health Information Privacy 
Laboratory (Vanderbilt University) (39, 49). Researchers from 
these groups and others recently participated in a 2016 Data 
Linkage and Anonymisation programme at the Isaac Newton 
Institute for Mathematical Sciences (Cambridge University, 
supported by EPSRC grant no EP/K032208/1)2; this 6-month 
international programme included seminars and workshops on 
linkage and privacy protection to share and advance knowledge 
in the mathematical sciences and related disciplines. A key goal of 
the forum was to “enhance opportunities for the analysis of data, 
2 https://www.newton.ac.uk/event/dla.
especially obtained through linkage, whilst protecting privacy 
and taking account of related practical constraints.”
At an operational level, PPRL featured prominently in the 
2016 International Population Data Linkage Network Conference 
(Swansea University), with several presentations on the topic 
including a keynote session that described a collaboration 
between international research institutions in Canada, Australia, 
and Wales (44, 46, 50–53).
OPPOrtUNitY AND cHANGe 
MANAGeMeNt
In addition to reducing the privacy risks associated with record 
linkage, the advent of PPRL protocols potentially heralds a new 
era of population-focused research using linked data, bridg-
ing gaps, and opening up opportunities for new and different 
forms of linkage-based research. PPRL methods may provide 
an avenue to access previously “hard to get” datasets (i.e., those 
with significant legal or regulatory constraints). PPRL methods 
may also provide a mechanism for accessing and integrating 
data from new and emerging sources. As well as data from new 
technologies (e.g., wearable devices, smartphone apps), these 
new sources may include the private health sector that has, to 
date, had limited exposure to, and engagement with, data linkage 
frameworks (54, 55).
New methods may require new or adjusted models of opera-
tion. Some custodians have expressed a desire to have flexibility 
in record linkage models to accommodate the features of different 
data collections (50). However, different or altered data linkage 
operating models can have significant implications for end-user 
timeframes, operational efficiency, and linkage quality (50), and 
these need to be carefully managed and monitored. It is impor-
tant that the strengths and limitations of the PPRL methods are 
understood. This will require conversations with stakeholders 
(i.e., data custodians, linkage units, researchers, and the com-
munity) around the risk–benefit of these new models and the 
expected realization of public benefit.
cONcLUsiON
The implementation of PPRL methods that do not require the 
release of personal information but protect privacy through 
other mechanisms (e.g., encryption methods) represents a 
breakthrough in record linkage, substantially reducing privacy 
risks without negatively impacting on linkage quality. By 
utilizing methods that do not require the release of personally 
identifying information, concerns regarding personal surveil-
lance and government overreach can be allayed. Supplementing 
traditional linkage methods with PPRL methods will increase 
the number and type of datasets that can be included in record 
linkage studies.
The advent of PPRL methods to protect patient privacy 
expands the toolkit of techniques that are available to DLUs. Used 
in conjunction with traditional linkage methods, PPRL widens 
the net of record linkage without compromising privacy or link-
age quality. These methods will hopefully allow more diverse, 
patient-centered data sources to be utilized for health research, 
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bringing enormous opportunities to increase our understand-
ing of disease and to tailor interventions and treatment to each 
individual.
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